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Abstract
Background Underlying systems factors have been seen
to be crucial contributors to the occurrence of medication
errors. By understanding the causes of these errors, the
most appropriate interventions can be designed and
implemented to minimise their occurrence.
Objective This study aimed to systematically review and
appraise empirical evidence relating to the causes of
medication administration errors (MAEs) in hospital
settings.
Data Sources Nine electronic databases (MEDLINE,
EMBASE, International Pharmaceutical Abstracts, ASSIA,
PsycINFO, British Nursing Index, CINAHL, Health Man-
agement Information Consortium and Social Science
Citations Index) were searched between 1985 and May
2013.
Study Selection Inclusion and exclusion criteria were
applied to identify eligible publications through title anal-
ysis followed by abstract and then full text examination.
English language publications reporting empirical data on
causes of MAEs were included. Reference lists of included
articles and relevant review papers were hand searched for
additional studies. Studies were excluded if they did not
report data on specific MAEs, used accounts from indi-
viduals not directly involved in the MAE concerned or
were presented as conference abstracts with insufficient
detail.
Data Appraisal and Synthesis Methods A total of 54
unique studies were included. Causes of MAEs were cat-
egorised according to Reason’s model of accident causa-
tion. Studies were assessed to determine relevance to the
research question and how likely the results were to reflect
the potential underlying causes of MAEs based on the
method(s) used.
Results Slips and lapses were the most commonly
reported unsafe acts, followed by knowledge-based mis-
takes and deliberate violations. Error-provoking conditions
influencing administration errors included inadequate
written communication (prescriptions, documentation,
transcription), problems with medicines supply and storage
(pharmacy dispensing errors and ward stock management),
high perceived workload, problems with ward-based
equipment (access, functionality), patient factors (avail-
ability, acuity), staff health status (fatigue, stress) and
interruptions/distractions during drug administration. Few
studies sought to determine the causes of intravenous
MAEs. A number of latent pathway conditions were less
well explored, including local working culture and high-
level managerial decisions. Causes were often described
superficially; this may be related to the use of quantitative
surveys and observation methods in many studies, limited
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use of established error causation frameworks to analyse
data and a predominant focus on issues other than the
causes of MAEs among studies.
Limitations As only English language publications were
included, some relevant studies may have been missed.
Conclusions Limited evidence from studies included in
this systematic review suggests that MAEs are influenced
by multiple systems factors, but if and how these arise and
interconnect to lead to errors remains to be fully deter-
mined. Further research with a theoretical focus is needed
to investigate the MAE causation pathway, with an
emphasis on ensuring interventions designed to minimise
MAEs target recognised underlying causes of errors to
maximise their impact.
1 Background
The reality that medical treatment can harm patients is one
that the healthcare community has had to come to terms with
over recent years [1]. In particular, adverse events associated
with medication appear among the chief causes of this harm
while patients reside in hospitals [2] and are known to be
responsible for a large proportion of hospital admissions [3].
Preventable adverse drug events (ADEs) occurring during the
medication use process in hospitals are associated with
additional length of stay and healthcare costs [4]. Prescribing
and drug administration appear to be associated with the
greatest number of medication errors (MEs), whether harm is
caused or not [5–7]. Recent systematic reviews of medication
administration error (MAE) prevalence in healthcare settings
found that they were common [8, 9], with one reporting an
estimated median of 19.1 % of ‘total opportunities for error’
in hospitals [8]. A significant proportion of MAEs are asso-
ciated with actual or potentially harmful effects [8, 10].
The key to implementing a successful intervention that
minimises MAEs is to understand how and why they occur.
As nurses find themselves as the ‘last link in the drug
therapy chain’ where an error can reach the patient [11],
they have traditionally been blamed for errors [11, 12].
However, the reality is that the conditions within which the
person responsible for the error works, as well as the
strategic decisions of the organisation with whom they are
employed, are often the key determinants of error [13, 14].
Frameworks for analysing medical error [13, 15] as well as
taxonomies for recording MEs [16, 17] have been devel-
oped that recognise this distinction.
In order to determine the cause of error, one must appre-
ciate the intentions of the person responsible for it [18]. To
achieve this, one might ask directly, but care must be taken as
MAE data generated in this way could be based on general
nursing opinion rather than experiences of specific errors
[19, 20], which may not reveal the true complexity of how
individual MAEs arise. Another method would be to observe
what causes errors as they happen without referring to the
person directly involved with the error, whilst avoiding
researcher opinion on causality [21]. Direct observation has
been found to be the best available method for determining
the prevalence of MAEs [22, 23] and can identify potential
error causes and associated factors [24], which the person
making the error may not notice [25] or that retrospective
methods of identification may not uncover [26].
Whilst some have summarised the literature on the
causes of MAEs [27–33], to date there have been no
attempts to systematically review studies concerning cau-
ses of MAEs in all patient types in hospital settings. Most
of these reviews do not comment on the methodological
quality of studies they found and include data generated
from incident reports or general nursing opinion [27–32].
Therefore, a need exists to critically appraise this literature
in order to ensure the causes of MAEs are determined
based on a foundation of empirical (rather than surmised)
data. The aim of this research was therefore to systemati-
cally review and appraise the empirical evidence available
relating to the causes of MAEs in hospital settings.
2 Literature Search Method
2.1 Search Strategy
The following electronic databases were searched by RNK:
MEDLINE, EMBASE, International Pharmaceutical
Abstracts, Cumulative Index for Nursing and Allied Health
Literature, PsycINFO, Health Management Information
Consortium, Social Science Citation Index (all 1985–May
2013), British Nursing Index (1994–May 2013) and Applied
Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (1987–May 2013).
Search terms used fell broadly into three groups:
description of error [including error(s); medication error(s);
incident report(s); near miss(es); drug error(s); treatment
error(s); medication safety, drug safety, preventable
adverse event(s), adverse event(s), medical error(s), clini-
cal incident(s), adverse drug event(s), adverse health care
event(s), health care error(s), medication incident(s)], var-
iable of interest [cause(s); factor(s); reason(s); aetiology;
etiology; causality; causalities; predictor(s); association(s)]
and error type [including drug/medication/medicine
administration(s); dose/drug/medicine/medication prepara-
tion(s); drug/medication/medicine delivery; omission(s);
drug utilisation; commission(s); drug/medication/medicine
supply; drug/medication/medicine handling; self medica-
tion; self administration]. Depending on database func-
tionality, some terms underwent slight modification.
The reference lists of included studies and relevant
review articles were hand searched to identify additional
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eligible studies. Study authors were not generally contacted
for additional data. Once all database searches had been
conducted, duplicate citations were identified and excluded
using reference management software (EndNote X3) and
manual title examination.
2.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Studies that reported data on the causes of MAEs made in
inpatient hospital settings published between 1985 and
May 2013 were sought. Studies were included if they were
published in English and identified causes in relation to
specific errors or near misses that staff members either
made themselves or were directly involved with. Relevant
review articles were excluded, though their reference lists
were hand searched for additional studies. Conference
abstracts were excluded if they did not provide enough
relevant data. Studies that reported on results based on
simulation, or concerned with only one subtype of MAE,
were excluded, as were studies reporting results obtained
from incident or case reports as it could not be determined
whether the person reporting the incident had been directly
involved.
2.3 Data Extraction Method
The following details were extracted from all publications
meeting the inclusion criteria: core details (including year
of publication, first author, country of origin, study period),
study background (including study type, setting, sampling
strategy, drug administration route(s) studied, details of
observers, subject details, definitions of administration
error, error detection method(s), cause detection method(s),
error framework categorisation if used), results (causes of
MAEs), and additional information (including relevance of
study to review aims). Data were extracted independently
by RNK, JC and SDW; the authors met to resolve any
differences in their results.
2.4 Definitions
An MAE was defined as ‘a deviation from the prescriber’s
medication order as written on the patient’s chart, manu-
facturers’ instructions or relevant institutional policies’ [8,
24, 34]. Ward-level medication preparation and dispensing
errors were included, whilst prescribing and pharmacy
dispensing errors were not.
Causes were defined as ‘reasons reported to the
researcher by the person directly involved with a specific
administration error or near miss as being wholly or partly
responsible for said error’. Direct observation could also
provide data on causes of MAEs, provided it did not
depend upon researcher opinion on causality.
2.5 Data Analysis
2.5.1 Categorisation
Extracted data on causes were aggregated and summarised
according to theme, with Reason’s model of accident
causation [18, 35] used as a framework to categorise and
present the data. Heterogeneity between studies meant that
no attempt was made to quantify the frequency of MAE
causes; such analyses would mislead readers, as a notion of
frequency would be presented that may not reflect the true
burden [21]. Instead, the number of papers reporting the
presence of a particular cause were considered to identify
(i) whether future research is required to explore this cause
in more detail, and (ii) future potential targets for inter-
vention to minimise MAEs.
Reason explains that systems such as healthcare have in
place barriers or safeguards (e.g. double checking in
healthcare) that protect a particular process or task from
erroneous behaviour or subversion [13]. However, these
defensive barriers can be weakened by decisions made dur-
ing the design of the barriers and the wider systems in which
they lie, and by actions or omissions of those people working
on the front line. High-level design decisions may be flawed
or simply a product of the constraints in which the managers
function (e.g. financial, regulatory), and in turn shape the
‘front line’ working environment and can therefore make it
error prone; together they form the ‘latent’ error pathway,
and these working conditions are called ‘error- or violation-
producing conditions’ [36] (see Fig. 1). The worker who
carries out the task may also weaken the defensive barrier by
making errors or not following procedure; these can be
termed ‘unsafe acts’, and their effects are usually short lived
when compared with managerial decisions and error-pro-
voking conditions, which can lie dormant for many years
until they are addressed [13, 35, 36]. Unsafe acts describe the
acts or omissions of staff in the process of care and include
skill-based errors such as ‘slips’ and ‘lapses’, as well as
knowledge- and rule-based ‘mistakes’, and deliberate ‘vio-
lations’ of practice [35]. An unsafe act such as a nurse
choosing the wrong drug to administer is more likely to be
administered to a patient and result in an MAE if error- or
violation-producing conditions in the working environment,
as well as contributing high-level decisions, are present [13].
2.5.2 Quality Assessment
Quality assessment was integrated into the review process
in two ways by RNK. First, by filtering out studies in which
authors speculated as to the causes for MAEs, or where
participants were asked to report on the causes of errors
more generally, we ensured that only ‘empirical’ data
based on specific error experiences were included.
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The second stage of quality assessment occurred after
data extraction. Due to the heterogeneity of study designs,
in-depth quality analysis was impractical; instead broad
quality criteria were applied by RNK and considered
relating to three main interests: the relevance of the study
to the aims of this review; the method of sampling/sample
size and finally the method of MAE causes data collection.
3 Results
3.1 Search Process
In all, 55 publications were eligible for inclusion. Three
studies reported data from two countries [37–39] (and were
considered six unique studies) and four [40–43] reported from
the same data set as sister articles [34, 44, 45] (each group was
considered one unique study) yielding 54 unique studies. A
total of 21,799 articles were excluded at the title review stage
as they were either duplications or were not related to medi-
cation safety topics. Abstracts were then reviewed and articles
excluded if they were not thought to report on the causes of
MEs. At the full-text examination stage, only studies focusing
on the causes of MAEs in hospitals were included. A summary
of the search process is shown in Fig. 2.
3.2 Study Characteristics
3.2.1 Country of Origin
Twelve (12/54, 22.2 %) unique studies each originated
from the UK [34, 37–40, 46–53] and the USA [6, 7, 38, 42,
43, 45, 54–61]. Six (11.1 %) originated from Australia
[62–67]; four (7.4 %) from South Africa [68–71]; three
(5.6 %) each from New Zealand [72–74] and Germany [37,
39, 41, 44], and two each (3.7 %) from Canada [75, 76] and
Malaysia [77, 78]. The remaining studies were each from
separate countries: The Netherlands [79], Spain [80], India
[81], Taiwan [82], Iran [83], Ethiopia [84], South Korea
[85], China [86], Norway [87] and Turkey [88]. Study
characteristics are summarised in Table 1.
3.2.2 Study Setting and Patient Demographics
A total of 20 studies were carried out in teaching hospitals
(37.0 %) and 13 in general or unspecified hospitals
(24.1 %). Tertiary care hospitals were the setting for four
studies [56, 57, 69, 81] and an army medical centre for
another [55]. Two studies were set in paediatrics hospitals
[65, 74] and three did not report the institutions from which
data originated [59, 68, 71]; however, because they
reported MAE data from anaesthetists and inpatient set-
tings, it was assumed that they had originated from hospital
environments. Eleven studies were carried out in a range of
clinical settings that included hospitals of various types.
Seven studies were conducted solely on paediatric units
(13.0 %) [6, 55, 59, 65, 74, 78, 88]. Eleven were carried
out using only adult patients (20.4 %). The remainder were
either carried out with both adult and paediatric patients
(n = 8, 14.8 %) [34, 40, 51, 54, 58, 60, 84, 86, 87] or the
ages of patients were not specified (n = 28, 51.9 %).
Fourteen (25.9 %) studies were conducted on only one
unit and 22 (40.7 %) on two or more units within each
institution. Seven studies did not specify how many units
per institution were observed but could have been numer-
ous given the sampling strategy used [42, 43, 45, 52, 54,
Fig. 1 Reason’s model of accident causation as applied to medication administration errors in hospitals [13, 18, 35, 36]
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58, 63, 82, 85]. Nine studies carried out in anaesthesia
could also have sourced data from more than one theatre
per hospital based on their sampling techniques [68–72, 75,
81, 86, 87]. Two studies did not state how many units were
involved [59, 60].
3.2.3 Study Design
All studies utilising the direct observation method (n = 23,
42.6 %) identified MAEs prospectively, with some con-
firming the error once the medication administration round
had finished (n = 8) and others during this activity
(n = 10) (five studies did not specify when MAEs were
confirmed). One study utilised observation with chart
review [84] and another utilised interviews [67] for pro-
spective and retrospective error identification. Those that
did not utilise direct observation to identify MAEs
employed a variety of error-detection methods; these
included prospective self-reporting methods such as log
books (n = 2, 3.7 %) [54, 58], error (e.g. incident) reports
(n = 3, 5.6 %) [53, 56, 57] and anaesthetic administration
forms (n = 4) [69, 72, 86, 87]. Other prospective methods
relied on other healthcare staff or researchers to identify
errors through routine activity or chart review [53, 56, 57,
62]. Retrospective methods included interviews (n = 7)
[51, 52, 59–61, 63, 66], questionnaires/surveys (n = 10)
[42, 43, 45, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 75, 81, 82, 85] and focus
groups [73, 74]. Some of these studies described a vali-
dation process to confirm the presence of an error after the
observation period [6, 7, 56, 57, 77].
Besides the use of self-report methods to detect data
(n = 16), MAEs were most often collected by pharmacists
or pharmacy students (n = 19, 35.2 %) or nurses/nurse
students (n = 9). Five studies did not specify who col-
lected the data [50, 59, 63, 77, 78] and five utilised com-
binations of various healthcare professionals [53, 56, 57,
80, 84].
Data on causes of MAEs were generally collected
prospectively whilst directly observing staff activity on
the unit(s) (n = 18). Some studies combined observation
with chart review [84], informal conversations with staff
(n = 2) [34, 40, 41, 44] or interviews (n = 4) [67, 77,
Fig. 2 Study identification and exclusion process
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78, 88]. Self-report data was another common method to
collect MAE causes; staff used daily log books (n = 2)
[54, 58], incident forms for each anaesthetic procedure
(n = 4) [69, 72, 86, 87] or surveys/questionnaires
(n = 10) [42, 43, 45, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 75, 81, 82, 85].
Two studies utilised focus groups to collect these data
[65, 73]. Various types of interview were used by the
remaining studies to report causes data (n = 11) [51–53,
56, 57, 59–63, 66]. Of those using survey methodology,
two used open-ended questions to solicit data [42, 43,
45, 85], three used a limited list of contributory factors
from which participants could choose [75, 82, 85] and
six did not state the type of questioning employed [64,
65, 68, 70, 71, 81]. Excluding self-reporting methods
(n = 16), causes data collectors were most often phar-
macists (n = 18), or nurses/nursing students (n = 7).
3.2.4 Definition of a Medication Administration Error
The definition of MAEs varied considerably between
studies. Twenty-one (38.9 %) studies did not give a formal
or working definition. Nine (16.7 %) studies used their own
definition without referencing any established criteria. Of
those who referenced criteria as either a complete formal
definition or to supplement their own (n = 24, 44.4 %), the
most commonly used criteria used were those of Allan and
Barker [24] and the American Society of Health System
Pharmacists (ASHP) [89, 90].
3.2.5 Route of Administration
Fifteen studies (27.8 %) considered only the intravenous
route of administration, whereas the majority (n = 32,
59.3 %) studied all routes of administration. Seven studies
observed MAEs via a varying number of different admin-
istration routes [7, 37, 38, 47, 55]. Nine studies in the
intravenous group involved administration of medication
used for anaesthesia [68–72, 75, 81, 86, 87].
3.2.6 Staff Group
The majority of studies investigated errors directly
involving nurses (n = 35, 59.3 %), student nurses [63] or
both nurses and students [82] or nurses and nurse
assistants [80]. Five studies involved nurses and medical
staff [34, 39, 40, 77, 78] and eight studies obtained error
data from various grades of physician responsible for
administering anaesthetics [68–72, 75, 81, 86]. One study
involved nurses and anaesthetists in theatres [87]. Two
studies obtained data from various healthcare profes-
sionals who either made or were directly involved with
nursing MAEs [56, 57].
3.3 Quality Assessment
Relevance of studies to review question. Overall, few
studies were predominantly concerned with the causes of
only MAEs (n = 6) [34, 40–45, 52, 63, 82]; most consid-
ered these issues after other major objectives such as the
prevalence and nature of MAEs or more general experi-
ences of healthcare staff when making errors. Of the latter
group, examples included studies that focused on the
causes of MEs made by a variety of healthcare profes-
sionals [53, 56, 57, 62], and investigations of nurse atti-
tudes towards the defining or reporting of these errors and/
or their impact on professional practice [51, 53, 60, 64, 67].
Two asked participants to describe what factors influence
their ability to carry out safe practice [73] or medicines
management activities [66]. Sixteen studies (29.6 %) did
not report any intention to study the causes of specific
MAEs.
Sampling. The majority of studies provided insufficient
detail of their sampling strategy to determine its nature. A
minority (n = 5) reported random sampling of participants
[42, 43, 45, 54, 57, 58, 61], with only two describing the
method of randomisation [42, 43, 45, 57]. Some publica-
tions reported sampling techniques where specific institu-
tions or units were chosen; examples included wards with
high error risk [47, 78] or wards chosen to reflect the
patient population [76]. Another study recruited nurses
from all units within their hospital as part of representative
sampling [74]. Some studies interviewed staff based on
errors previously identified by other staff members or the
researchers [52, 53, 62, 77, 78, 88]. Two papers used the
snowball sampling technique to recruit nurse participants
[82, 85], two convenience sampling [39, 73] and nine self-
reporting based studies sampled the entire population
within specified limits (e.g. through registration databases)
[68–72, 75, 81, 86, 87]. One study used patients admitted
over a specific time period as the sample [56].
Reported sample size varied depending on the study
method; 30 (55.6 %) reported the number of staff respon-
sible for drug administration who took part in their study
(e.g. nurses). Participant numbers varied between seven
nurses in two studies [61, 62] and 720 anaesthetists in
another [68]. Of the remaining studies, 21 provided details
of the number of errors or the error rate, and three studies
did not specify sample size [59, 60, 67].
Causes data collection method. Studies that utilised
predominantly quantitative short answer surveys/question-
naires or direct observation methods alone were able to
identify important causes of errors; these were generally
limited in number (with a few exceptions [64, 82, 85]), did
not contain more detail explaining why these causes arose
and were not able to specify if multiple causes combined,
as data were not generally related to individual errors.
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These studies listed causes in tables/text using very brief
descriptors [6, 7, 38, 39, 50, 55, 64, 65, 72, 76, 79–83, 85].
For direct observation, these results are not surprising
considering that MAE causation data from observers that
involved opinions or generalisations were excluded (many
included such data [6, 7, 38, 48, 50, 55, 76, 80, 83]),
leaving only those activities that were factual (e.g. delayed
delivery of medication from pharmacy).
In contrast, interviews/conversations (±direct observa-
tion), focus groups or self-reporting methods involving
narrative free text responses generally provided a greater
variety of MAE causes. Some demonstrated the link
between administration errors/violations and their associ-
ated error-producing conditions using human error theory
[34, 40, 41, 44, 53, 62, 88]. Additional verbatim quotes
were used to confirm and expand upon data [34, 40–45, 51,
53, 54, 58, 62, 63, 74, 88], with some providing verbatim
quotes of individual errors that demonstrated how multiple
contributory factors combined to create MAEs [42, 43, 45,
54, 58, 62, 63, 73]. However, not all of these studies pro-
vided much information specific to MAEs [53, 60–62, 66,
74], and some provided only brief tabulated/textual data of
causes following interviews [51, 52, 56, 57, 61] or direct
observation with interviews [77, 78], much in the same
way as survey/direct observation studies. Despite this, it is
important to recognise that in some cases administration
errors were not the sole ME of interest [53, 56, 57, 62], and
many qualitative studies did not consider MAEs as their
primary research topic.
One study used Reason’s model of accident causation
explicitly [53]. Seven studies used criteria that appeared to
be based, at least in part, on elements of the systems
approach to analysis of errors [6, 7, 55–57, 62, 83]. Three
studies used elements of Reason’s model along with other
protocols for analysing adverse events [34, 40, 41, 44, 88].
Two studies used other referenced frameworks [64, 80].
Nine studies recorded a single reason or proximal cause for
each reported MAE without offering further supplementary
detail [6, 7, 38, 50, 56, 77, 78, 80]. Five studies only
investigated the causes of clinically significant MAEs [6, 7,
56, 57, 62], with the remainder either basing their data on
all types of MAEs or not distinguishing which type they
considered (e.g. referred to only as MEs).
A number of causes/factors studies reported methods
that had been tested in pilot/pre test phases (n = 15) [6, 7,
46, 51, 54, 58, 62, 65, 70, 77, 78, 82, 84, 85, 88]. Others
described run-in [79] or training phases [83] or based their
method on earlier work [53, 86]. Only five studies deter-
mined causes of MAEs through triangulation of methods
[34, 40, 41, 44, 77, 78, 88], which can be used to corrob-
orate findings and, in the case of direct observation
research when combined with interviews, bridge the gap
between causes of errors that those observing practice
cannot identify alone and those who make errors do not
notice themselves [25, 40]. Despite this, few of these
studies actually reported whether this actually was the case
[34, 40, 41, 44].
3.4 Reason’s Model of Accident Causation
The data from 54 studies presenting causes data were
analysed thematically according to Reason’s model and
summarised in Table 2.
3.4.1 Causes of MAEs
3.4.1.1 Unsafe Acts Seven studies reported usable data
matching Reason’s description of active failures [34, 40,
41, 44, 53, 56, 57, 62, 88]. The majority of studies iden-
tified primary causes of MAEs that could be attributed to
the individual responsible for the error without using an
established framework. These were broadly considered as
either slips, lapses, mistakes or violations.
Slips and lapses. Slips and lapses were common, being
identified by 29 studies (53.7 %). Misidentification of
either medication or a patient were among the most fre-
quently reported events considered as slips [54, 58, 68,
73, 76, 77, 81]. Misreading either a medication label/
product, prescription or other documentation was also
common [34, 40, 51, 52, 54, 58, 64, 77, 78]. Staff con-
fused look-a-like or sound-a-like medication names,
patient names and medication packaging, which led to
MEs [42, 43, 45, 56, 59, 63, 64, 69, 71, 72, 82, 85, 87].
Mental states such as lack of concentration, complacency
and carelessness were also reported [51, 52, 78]. Most of
the data was presented in tabular or list form in article
texts; more detailed examples from qualitative interviews,
focus groups or open-ended surveys were able to identify
the cause(s) of their slips and lapses [34, 40–45, 53, 62,
63, 73, 88]; these included nurses forgetting to sign a
medication order or misreading labels due to being busy
and/or distracted [42, 43, 45, 53, 88], failing to administer
a drug or being careless due to heavy workload, poor
staffing and/or being distracted [42, 43, 45, 73] and
selecting the wrong medication due to pressure from
others or busy/distracting environments [63].
Knowledge- and rule-based mistakes. Knowledge-based
mistakes were less frequent (n = 16), with staff explaining
that they did not know enough about the medication they
were administering [34, 40, 41, 44, 51, 52, 56, 66, 77, 78,
82], the infusion pump they were using [58] or the patient
to whom they were administering it [56, 82]. Rule-based
mistakes were generally not observed [88].
Violations. Violations were reported by 14 studies,
which were limited predominantly to data collection
methods involving (at least in part) conversations with
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Table 2 Summary of medication administration error (MAE) causes reported by included studies
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indicates that this type of MAE cause was described in the source document
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subjects to determine error causality. Where enough data
were provided, situational violations (those arising due to
necessity [e.g. poorly designed protocols, lack of staff])
were noted [53, 58, 67, 77, 78, 88]. Reasons for violations
included trusting senior colleagues [63], patients requests
[77], lack of access to suitable administration protocols
[88], patient acuity [58, 88], acting in the patients’ interests
(e.g. to avoid harm or optimise treatment) [53, 60, 66],
poor supervision/drug knowledge (associated with fast
bolus intravenous administration) [34, 40], lack of staff
(intentionally giving drugs early/late) [58, 67, 78] and
common accepted practice (administering without a signed
prescription) [53]. One nurse gave paracetamol 4 hourly
instead of the prescribed 6-hourly regimen because they
thought it would not be effective if given 6 hourly [66].
Other unsafe acts. Calculation errors [39, 48, 50, 52, 64,
74, 77, 78, 80, 87] and faulty checking activities [6, 7, 42,
43, 45, 56, 63, 72, 75, 77, 78, 80–82, 86] were commonly
reported. Difficulty with infusion equipment was also noted
[42, 43, 45, 56, 58, 76, 83]. Other errors included not
following instructions; insufficient evidence existed to
determine whether these were deliberate acts (and hence
violations) [51, 52, 77].
3.4.1.2 Latent Conditions Error- or violation-producing
conditions describe the circumstances in which errors
occur, and arise due to high-level managerial decisions.
Multiple conditions can lead to one unsafe act [36].
The patient. A total of 17 (31.5 %) studies reported
patient characteristics as causes of MAEs. Logistical
problems associated with delivery of medication were most
common and included lack of, difficulty with or delays
waiting for intravenous access [34, 39, 40, 49, 50, 67, 68]
(leading to wrong route [39], deterioration of medication
[49], omission [50], wrong time [49] and compatibility
errors [39]), and absent/sleeping patients during drug
administration rounds [49, 51, 67, 76, 88]. Severity of
patient illness (acuity) was reported by seven studies [42,
43, 45, 54, 55, 82, 86, 88]; some studies provided examples
of resulting errors, which included wrong time or dose
omission and, in many cases, the nurses were aware of their
actions, which would constitute a violation [54, 58, 88].
Patient behaviour also led to MAEs through non-coopera-
tion [34, 40, 51, 85], or prevented errors though knowledge
of medications [73].
Policies and procedures. Problems with policies or
procedures were reported on few occasions (n = 6).
Examples included absence of a policy [41, 44, 56] and
policies that were considered over-laborious [42, 43, 45],
or generally unsuitable [34, 40, 41, 44, 88] (which led to
wrong dose and time violations in one study [88]). Nurses
reported that they had only basic information to help them
safely mix and administer intravenous medications [41,
44]. Nurses were unclear about the role of the second
checker in one study, which contributed to MAEs [53].
Ward-based equipment. Problems with equipment used
to aid drug administration contributed to MAEs (n = 19).
Insufficient equipment (computers [62] or gloves [78])
[88], malfunctioning equipment [86] and ambiguous
equipment design (e.g. syringe driver, drug packaging) [34,
40, 41, 44, 50] were reported; more general problems with
drug charts included a lack of access [38, 50] and mis-
placement [50, 77], which combined with distractions and
a noisy environment to lead to a wrong drug error in one
interview study [63]. Example(s) of the nature of the
infusion pump problems were given by a few studies,
which reported that doses could either be administered
incorrectly due to being un-calibrated [77] or malfunc-
tioning (a nurse commented how she expected the pump to
work because it was well tested) [61], or not be adminis-
tered at all due to different pump properties [88] or pumps
that were not connected [78].
Health and personality. Physical feelings of fatigue,
tiredness/sleep deprivation, sickness and general discomfort
amongst staff were reported as contributory factors to errors
(n = 13) [42, 43, 45, 51, 52, 63–65, 68, 70–72, 82, 86, 88].
More detailed analysis of error accounts by one interview
study revealed cases where physical exhaustion was caused
by long hours and lack of breaks/food [63]. Staff member
mental state at the time of error occurrence was also
reported to lead to errors; stress [42, 43, 45, 51, 52, 62, 64],
boredom [68], nervousness (with being busy and young)
[42, 43, 45] and poor mood [82] were all found to be
associated, though their origins were not stated. Personality-
related causes were briefly reported as a lack of assertive-
ness/confidence [52] (including when challenging medical
staff [51]), error perception [88] and conscientiousness [51].
Training and experience. Staff inexperience played a
role in contributing to errors (n = 8) [34, 40, 42, 43, 45, 52,
72, 82, 86–88]. This included being unfamiliar with the
medication, environment, procedures or equipment, as well
as being ‘new’ [42, 43, 45, 82, 87]. The feeling of being a
newly qualified nurse in post was found in open-ended
survey questions to be related to violation-type errors as
nurses obeyed/trusted senior colleagues and felt pressure to
complete their rounds on time, which led to them not per-
forming their own safety checks [42, 43, 45]. Insufficient
training and experience has strong links with knowledge-
and rule-based mistakes [34, 40, 41, 44, 53, 88].
Inadequate training was also reported (n = 6), but few
specifically mentioned training regarding the practicalities
of preparing and administering medication [34, 40, 41, 44,
85]; one study reported that nurses felt their intravenous
drug administration skills were not assessed appropriately
[34, 40], which may have contributed to nurses learning
these skills from each other on the ward [34, 40, 41, 44].
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Communication. Difficulty with written communication
featured prominently (n = 19), with two studies reporting
that illegible [51, 64] and five unclear/messy [34, 40, 41,
44, 55, 77, 82] prescriptions contributed to MAEs. Tran-
scription errors were reported by some [37, 41–45, 50, 76,
83, 85], as were MAEs (e.g. omission and extra dose
errors) apparently caused by others’ documentation errors
when writing prescriptions or administering medication
[42, 43, 45, 50, 60, 65, 67, 77, 78], with open-ended sur-
veys and interviews relating one case to misinterpreting the
roles of nursing students and their supervisors [42, 43, 45].
Studies commonly reported more general communication
difficulties between healthcare staff or other services without
specifying their nature (n = 15). Those using interviews/
conversations (± direct observation) and open-ended survey
methods reported instances where nurses/doctors failed to
pass on information or successfully passed on incorrect
information to their colleagues resulting in a drug adminis-
tration delays [66, 67], drugs being given that should have
been withheld [77] and incorrect doses being administered
[42, 43, 45, 54]. Problems with labelling were also frequently
reported, though detail on their nature and relationship to
other causes was missing [49, 68, 70–72, 81, 82, 86].
Supervision and social dynamics. Poor supervision by
senior colleagues appears to have a role to play in MAE
causation, manifesting as pressuring students to administer
drugs more quickly, not supervising or assisting closely
enough or giving unclear/incorrect instructions (n = 4)
[34, 40, 42, 43, 45, 63, 86]. As discussed previously, spe-
cific error examples appear to link poor supervision to
violation-type errors and the provoking conditions of
inexperience, trusting colleagues and fatigue [34, 40, 42,
43, 45, 63], though supervision has also been linked to poor
equipment and workload in one example [42, 43, 45]. Two
studies reported apparent overconfidence in/from other
nurses when either communicating instructions (as a cause
of a wrong dose error) [42, 43, 45] or carrying out inde-
pendent checks (a dose calculation error) [74]. Pressure
from other staff members [42, 43, 45, 71], confronting and
intimidating behaviour [64] and social isolation from col-
leagues also feature as causes [42, 43, 45]. There were
examples of how proper supervision and communication
could maintain patient safety, through co-workers identi-
fying errors before they reached the patient [54, 63, 73].
Workload and skill mix. Heavy staff workload (n = 19)
appeared an important contributor to MAEs, and includes
end of shift/patient transfer pressures, patient load and
multitasking [34, 40–45, 67]. Resulting errors included
omissions [60] and violations [67, 88], though one study
found that workload appeared not be a contributory factor
(along with most other latent conditions) [57]. Workload
was found to combine with distractions to lead to errors in
intravenous administration [34, 40] and with patient acuity,
inexperience or local working practice to lead to other
errors [42, 43, 45, 62].
Skill mix of staff was identified by six studies, with two
stating a lack of qualified staff [34, 40, 51] and others that
working with inexperienced or new staff members con-
tributed to MAEs [64, 72]. Short staffing was reported by
six studies as a cause of MAEs [42, 43, 45, 51, 64, 78, 82].
Distractions and interruptions. Sixteen studies found
that interruptions/distractions were a cause of MAEs,
though details of the nature of these distractions or their
interplay with other contributory factors were rarely given.
Of these studies, those using interviews/conversations (±
observation) or surveys with open-ended questions pro-
vided more descriptive data; examples of resulting errors/
near errors included wrong drug [58], wrong time [34, 40]
and wrong dose calculations [88]. Distractions included
ward rounds [34, 40] or face-to-face/telephone conversa-
tions with co-workers/patients [42, 43, 45, 63] and were
often present with high workload and/or poor supervision
[34, 40, 63].
General work environment. Eleven studies reported on
the contribution of the general environment; specifically,
noise [64], lighting [64, 71], emergencies [88], and busy
[34, 40, 42, 43, 45, 54, 58, 73, 85] or chaotic [42, 43, 45,
54] working environments were identified. Studies offering
more detail through open-ended survey questions linked
these factors to short staffing, workload, patient acuity and
poor supervision [42, 43, 45].
Medicines supply and storage. Issues relating to medi-
cines logistics were reported by 27 studies. A lack of ward
stock led to omission/wrong time errors [37, 38, 47, 51,
78–80, 84]. Medication was misplaced or lost on the ward
on occasions [47, 62, 75, 81]. In contrast, one study found
no errors relating to medication unavailability [50]. The
pharmacy department contributed to errors and violations
in other cases, through delayed deliveries [50, 55, 66, 76,
85, 88], incorrect dispensing [6, 38, 42, 43, 45, 51, 55, 58]
and unavailable stock [58, 78, 79].
Local working culture. Nurses passed on bad practices
(e.g. administering without a prescription) that led to errors
in three studies [34, 40, 41, 44]. Levels of trust between
colleagues [53] and working double shifts or not taking
breaks (leading to exhaustion) [42, 43, 45] were additional
causes. One nurse described how a wrong drug was
selected for administration in a busy and chaotic theatre
environment when she/he ‘‘relied on routine’’ [42, 43, 45].
Organisational (high-level) decisions. Included studies
rarely reported organisational/high-level decisions as hav-
ing a direct impact on error occurrence; feedback on errors
was considered important by some interview or survey
studies using narrative responses to minimise errors in
future, and the importance of nurse input in the process was
highlighted in one case [42, 43, 45]. Some described
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supervisory teams responding to errors poorly [63], that
opportunities to learn from mistakes were limited [42, 43,
45, 53] and how positive feedback about errors improved
nursing practice [63, 64]. More direct causal evidence cited
a lack of hospital policy (when challenging other health-
care staff) or misguided policy (low nurse staffing) as
causes of MAEs [56, 82], as well as decisions regarding
logistical strategy generally revolving around clashes of
other ward activities with medication administration [42,
43, 45, 50, 78]. Mix-ups involving medicines that look or
sound alike may have roots beyond hospitals with the
pharmaceutical industry [34, 40].
4 Discussion
Empirical evidence from this systematic review demon-
strates that staff responsible for preparation and adminis-
tration of medication are prone to making unsafe acts, but
that their errors are heavily influenced by local working
conditions. Key strengths of this systematic review are that
it is the first to span hospital healthcare over the last
28 years and a critical approach has been used to assess
study eligibility and quality.
There was little consistency between studies in terms of
the method(s), settings and definitions they used. This may
be in large part due to the varied purposes of the included
studies. This inconsistency created differences in the types
of data generated pertinent to the causes of MAEs and its
level of detail; those studies that used certain data collec-
tion methods (interviews [with or without direct observa-
tion] and free-text self reporting), utilised error frameworks
to present their data and/or focused on the causes of MAEs
tended to provide a wider variety of MAE causes, details of
their origins and whether or not they interacted with each
other. Considering that only a small proportion of included
studies predominantly sought to determine the causes of
MAEs, and that only five of these used more qualitative
methods [34, 40–45, 52, 56], the overall proportion of
richer MAE causation data is small. Many studies reported
data that included both potential unsafe acts and latent
pathway causes without distinguishing between them [6, 7,
48, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, 64, 68, 71, 72, 77, 78, 80, 82].
In contrast with the above, studies that utilised more
structured methods or used direct observation alone did not
allow sufficient flexibility in questioning to allow the
generation of the same level of causal detail [91], did not
often provide information on how causal factors linked to
specific MAEs (e.g. drug involved) or in the case of
observation alone could not explore thought processes that
underpinned actions as staff were not interviewed [24, 25,
40]. Given the evidence that prescribing errors can arise as
a result of multiple, interconnecting factors [92], the result
is that few studies without most of the methodological
restrictions described above are able to generate error
accounts that reflect this phenomena [34, 40–45, 54, 58, 63,
88]. Of these few, most do not provide break-down at the
individual error level.
In light of the strong influence of data collection method
on our findings, we did not attempt to infer meaning from
the frequency of causes reported across included papers, as
this may be misleading. One example is ‘medicines supply
and storage’ issues, which feature strongly (n = 27), lar-
gely due to data derived from direct observation alone
(*50 % of studies)—a method that identified a limited
number of MAE causes restricted to the latent pathway.
More general limitations of self-reporting methods such
as log books, administration reports, interviews and ques-
tionnaires include being subject to social desirability bias
[93], potentially leading to modified reporting of MAEs
[21]. Though direct observation may be susceptible to
biased observer inference and the ‘Hawthorne effect’,
whereby behaviour is modified in the presence of the
observer [25], the effect of these phenomena can either be
controlled through appropriate training for the former [24]
or appears to be limited for the latter [26]. Alternative
methods to identify potential causes of MAEs include
prospective risk analysis methods such as failure mode
effects analysis [94], but they have their own limitations
[95] and may use general options as well as specific error
accounts in their design.
Despite the above challenges associated with the body
of literature, important causes of MAEs were identified.
Slips and lapses were the most commonly identified unsafe
acts, followed by violations and knowledge-based mis-
takes. Misidentification or misinterpretation of prescrip-
tions or patients appeared to occur frequently but their
origins were not well described. Though sparse, more
detailed information showed that slips and lapses were
related to distractions, high workload and poor staffing, and
that confusion with drug names/packages may arise from
planning of medication locations and pharmaceutical
manufacturer designs [34, 40, 48, 64, 68, 69, 71, 75, 81].
Bar code-assisted administration has been associated with a
decrease in some types of MAEs but increases in risk for
others [96], as well as introducing novel errors in the form
of ‘work-arounds’ [97]. The problems with technology
identified in this review further emphasise the need to
ensure its careful design and implementation.
Inadequate knowledge of medication appears to be a
well recognised contributor to MAEs [27, 30, 32] and may
extend back to inadequate teaching of clinical pharmacol-
ogy [27]. Nurses’ knowledge of ‘high-risk’ medication
groups, such as cardiovascular and electrolytes may be
limited [98], which is important given their association
with MAEs [8].
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Although problems with checking around medication
administration were frequently reported, little detail was
provided as to their nature. To date there is scant evidence
to support the notion that double checking reduces the MAE
rate [99]. Although failure in following policy/procedures
may be a common contributing factor to MAEs [27, 28, 30,
32], it has been suggested that repeated identity checking
undermines the nurse–patient relationship [100]. The small
number of studies providing insight into the origins of
violations suggests that their origins may lie in staff rela-
tionships, patient interactions, general workload and insti-
tutional policies and procedures. Recent work suggests that
violations of medication administration protocols may be
more likely in certain circumstances [101] and that they
arise depending on the nurses workload, familiarity with the
drug and patient, and local working culture [65].
The volume and range of written communication errors
described indicates that they are a widespread, persistent
problem in secondary care. Unsuitable prescriptions fea-
tured prominently, which suggests that quality adminis-
tration is dependent on other healthcare professionals
performing their roles appropriately. This is further
emphasised from more detailed accounts of errors resulting
from incorrect provision of information or documentation
by colleagues, though further research exploring their ori-
gins are required, as so far these appear limited to a mis-
understanding of the student/supervisor relationship.
Transcribing errors were reported but appear to occur
mainly in countries where nurses were expected to tran-
scribe physician orders [37, 38, 41, 44]. The presence of
pharmacy dispensing errors and more specifically ward
stock/supply problems on the MAE causal pathway high-
lights additional communication challenges. Electronic
prescribing and printed prescriptions may improve the
prescribing process [14, 102], though mixed changes in
some ME subtypes have been noted [48, 79, 102]. A closed
loop electronic prescribing, dispensing and administration
system may help confront some of the problems between
different healthcare professionals identified above [103].
High workload has links to poor staffing, which in turn are
both therefore related to organisational decisions regarding
recruitment, though few studies made this association [42,
43, 45, 82]. Most data on workload comprise brief descrip-
tions with limited evidence suggesting aetiology and whe-
ther combinations with other causes such as interruptions/
distractions and inexperience lead to errors; more evidence is
therefore required to explore the role of workload in MAE
causation. Studies have linked nurse staffing levels to neg-
ative patient outcomes, including MEs [104], but this rela-
tionship is complex, and further study is required to
understand more clearly the role MAEs have to play.
Distractions and interruptions disrupt concentration and
attention, which can lead to loss in patient focus [105] and
subsequently incorrect actions or omissions that result in
errors [18]. Direct observation-based studies demonstrate
that interruptions increase the occurrence of MAEs across
different healthcare settings [106–108]. Despite highlight-
ing interruptions as a common problem, this review found
examples of their nature were limited to conversations,
phone calls and patient acuity (some described delaying/
missing dose administration when they had to deal with a
sick patient). More focused work has characterised the
nature of interruptions [59, 106], and recommendations for
minimisation could involve training nurses to prioritise
multiple requests and targeting those interruptions that are
preventable [59, 109]. No studies have evaluated the effect
of an intervention designed to reduce interruptions and
MAEs using a direct observation MAE-detection method.
Despite poor physical and mental condition being a
common contributor to MAEs, few examples of the aetiol-
ogy or interaction of these conditions were provided, with the
exception of exhaustion, which has been linked to working
hours and lack of shift breaks. Working hours have been
linked to increased nursing errors of various kinds (including
MAEs) [104]. With a continuing drive to implement
healthcare technology to improve patient safety [110], it is of
vital importance that issues relating to proper maintenance,
access and ease-of-use, identified as causes of MAEs in this
review, are addressed in their design and implementation.
When considered with the prominence of medicines supply
issues, medication administration can be viewed as the cul-
mination of multiple high-risk processes that complicate
nursing practice and place patients in potential danger.
Organisational safety culture refers to individual and
group values, attitudes, competencies and behavioural
patterns that decide the organisation’s safety programmes
[111]. The nature and influence of this culture on MAEs
remains relatively unexplored, as do wider organisational
strategic decisions, where findings were generally limited
to indirect associations involving logistical problems when
scheduling medication administration with other ward
activities and the effects of error feedback mechanisms.
This may be because evidence has predominantly origi-
nated from ‘front-line’ staff rather than organisational
leaders and managers.
Compared with studies involving nurses, research in
anaesthesia utilised more restrictive self-reporting methods
exclusively, resulting in the identification of few contrib-
utory factors of unknown aetiology. Of the remaining
studies considering only the intravenous administration
route, the focus of all but two [34, 40, 41, 44] was not
predominantly on the causes of MAEs. Although these
provided useful data, they did not utilise interviews with
those who made the errors, which the authors themselves
state may limit the identification of more personal error
causes.
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4.1 Limitations of Review
By excluding non-English publications, the potential for
publication bias may exist when focusing on the causes of
MAEs. As we gathered evidence from both qualitative and
quantitative studies, we were only able to compare study
quality/relevance at a limited level, though our appraisal
process was able to identify important areas for further
exploratory research and potential interventions to mini-
mise MAEs in hospitals.
5 Conclusions
This systematic review has demonstrated that MAEs have
multiple causes, including both unsafe acts and error-/
violation-provoking conditions, and that a limited number
of these conditions may combine in unique situations to
result in error. However, due to a number of reasons, this
intricate pathway has thus far only been superficially
explored. There is a lack of consistency in approaching
MAE causation research with regards to the methods used
and whether error causation frameworks are utilised to
analyse results. Given that a number of existing (and
sometimes complex) interventions have shown that their
results only partially address the MAE challenge, and in
some cases create novel error opportunities, it is recom-
mended that further research with a strong theoretical focus
be undertaken to investigate the nature and complexity of
causes behind MAEs, with a particular emphasis on which
interventions may result in substantial, long-lasting
improvements in patient safety.
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